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ABSTRACT 
BugTraq, a popular mailing list now hosted by securityfocus.com, was founded in 
1993 to provide a forum for open publication of computer and network security 
vulnerabilities. Due primarily to the rapid pace of software development and the 
proliferation of the Internet, there has been a shift away from keeping computer security 
vulnerabilities private. Prior to such mailing lists as BugTraq, information on computer 
and network security vulnerabilities remained in the hands of a few, primarily computer 
security researchers and the underground criminal element. Retaliation to this form of 
private information has led many working in computer security to adopt what has become 
known as full disclosure. The practice of publicly disclosing computer security 
vulnerabilities has led to a heated debate, as there are both positive and negative 
consequences of releasing such information to the masses. 
The goal of this distinction project is to determine the attitudes that those in the 
computer security community currently hold regarding issues surrounding full disclosure. 
Two hypotheses are tested. First, a majority of those in the computer security field 
support the full disclosure model of disseminating vulnerability information and second, 
attitudes on the full disclosure debate will vary across participation in different computer 
security circles. In order to test these hypotheses, opinions from users of full disclosure 
information and computer security practitioners were solicited through use of an on-line 
survey. Survey links were distributed through the FBI-coordinated computer security 
organization, InfraGard, the Information Systems Security Association, and the popular 
full disclosure mailing list, BugTraq. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
out 
not 
8.0, 
Introduction 
websites, shut them down, 
activities. However, 
demand technical 
a keynote 
largest annual hacking 
roomful and others attending the 
More specifically, Ranum 
world 
information is publicly 
computer security 
or holes in computer 
thus making it 
is a practice that is 
predicts won't be 
individuals who distribute 
lawsuits. 
numbers, and carry 
computer security problems are 
security consultant 
Suck" at DEF CON 
move, Ranum told a 
that they had better 
a call to change the way 
were told that when they find 
think twice about telling the 
pr""n,p how to exploit the known 
(script kiddies) to 
security community and one 
prediction is that in next 
will find 
are connected to the with an increasing number 
v""",u,,"'''''' connections, IS are not the only ones being victimized by 
According to is finding himself of 
starting to up and script kiddies are not 
his 
Our Vulnerability 
Computer software is not of number 111 
range 5 to 15 bugs thousand lines of code (Schneier, c 336). put this into 
that Microsoft's Windows 2000 system 35 
million lines of code (Schneier, c 210). Noting a trend increased 
m source security author more 
complex IS secure on all fronts. It Irn.'c,,:,,~c to start with, its 
modularity those it's to understand, 
and it's harder to (Schneier, c or inherent m 
software, may leave to are 
computer security vulnerabilities, or simply vulnerabilities. 
Individuals with malicious (often rp1"''',......>r! to as blackhat may 
take ""''''con' of vulnerabilities to compromise data confidentiality, 
authentication. in the world seeks to ensure that only the people intended 
to see have access to (confidentiality), the is not maliciously m 
any way the """,,,.CAn or program that created the . , IS genume 
(authentication). When security is successfully compromised, the security 
breach cause devastating losses. For an annual joint survey conducted by 
Computer and the 2000,an of 
survey could quantify the due to computer The most serious 
2 
financial were those occurring from data confidentiality, 
in theft of proprietary information. 
in today's software products floodgate for malicious 
and computer crime. Corporation a web server with a 
essentially lays down a mat for many breaches of security, 
or a security problems will 
Corporation XYZ server vulnerabilities are effectively 
For example, a discovered Internet Information 
approximately 90 percent all servers running on Windows NT 
wide open to attacks (McGraw). 
Common Vulnerabilities 
rlTT""Cl'CP vulnerabilities are not a new Often, the same types 
are found and exploited. For buffer overflows are the most 
common security vulnerability in (Schneier, c 207). Buffer 
prevalent Vv'vUlh"v a lack of programmer ingenuity 
and to take security as well as consideration when coding. 
Buffer overflows are inherently C'A1TU'<lrp written in C and while 
more modern programming '~"'f'>uUf'>'-" as are immune to the 
(McGraw). Every program needs a to store bi ts and most computer nrr'O"r51n"l 
create sections in memory for The C programming L~"b~'~b-
to create storage at memory regions known as a 
pn)grarrlm,er writes more data onto a it has room for, the extra must 
1 A denial-of-service attack is when communication and memory buffers are flooded to 
lej1:ltlITlate network traffic from passing 
3 
somewhere, a potential security excess data resulting from a 
buffer overflow overwrite other data and some security critical 
Gary McGraw a to 
demonstrate implications of a simple 
In the case, consider a Boolean allocated in memory directly after a buffer. that 
the determines whether or not the user nmning the program can access private files. 1f a malicious user 
can overwrite the then the value of the flag can be thus providing the attacker with 
access to files. 
of 1988 is a how a buffer overflow was 
used to cause wide-spread worm exploited a buffer overflow in 
UNIX which returns a user when asked. 
a containing the identity of a user as However, size 
input was not allowing a buffer Input larger than 512 
and Morris wrote a input that allowed the 
to execute as rooe and install on new machine. Proliferating was a 
code worm copy itselfnot once, but 
on to the Internet. was that computers 
wOlm leaving over 6,000 disabled servers, represented 10% 
time (Schneier, c 209). 
based on the to validate user inputs are common. 
a neglects to input to make sure it is syntactically certain 
2 A worm is a malicious software program that moving across on a network. 
3 On a UNIX-based system, a user with root access has the power to add, any file residing 
on the Authors of the security L .... J'.IU~'''u. state UNIX 
there are two levels of access: the root and 
McClure, Scambray 306). Once root access is over" in the 
battle to maintain secure systems. 
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modules the program may fail, field-value errors. Authors of 
Hacking detail one an input validation attack: 
PHF is a Common Interface (CGI) that came standard with versions of 
Apache web server and NCSA HITPD. this program did not properly parse and validate 
the input it received. The version of the PHF accepted the newline character (%Oa) and 
executed any commands with the privileges of the user ID the web server.. In most 
cases, the user ID was "nobody," but there were many unfortunate sites that committed the cardinal sin of 
their web server with root privileges ... and many sites were as a result of this simple 
but effective (Kurtz, and 316,317) 
Learning vulnerabilities in specific ATT't",>,"", and hardware products can 
thought as first carrying out a breach security. must know the 
vulnerabilities of a system order to them. information on these 
vulnerabilities is disseminated an important factor in to 
maintain secure computer information systems. of vulnerability 
information and of those that these vulnerabilities is mam 
focal of this study. 
The Full Disclosure Movement 
Computer vulnerabilities are discovered everyday by researchers 
academia industry), product and curiosity 
or intent. When a vulnerability is found, the ,,,"HJPrpr has options. 
can do thereby keeping knowledge of vulnerability to himself. He can 
the can contact vendor the 
product. In the may to explain vulnerabi lity 
that he by detailed documentation on how found it. 
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may work with vendor order to produce a fiX4 for vulnerability. If 
vulnerability is potentially news, discoverer may want to the media to 
draw attention to his acumen or to cause for the 
vulnerable product. The discoverer also certain computer security 
organizations or tell whole world, in a known asfitll 
Full gained momentum recent as evidenced by an 
increasing number of publication venues containing vulnerability information. Following 
is a brief continuum the sources of vulnerability information, starting with a 
tightly controlled for vulnerability with 
most popular avenue for disclosing computer 
to the worm November 1988, The Computer 
more commonly referred to as was to address computer 
security concerns. housed the Software Institute Carnegie 
Mellon primarily handles incident vulnerability reports, a 
network contacts to respond to computer security emergencies. will 
respond 24 a day to that report compromised security. 
also serves as a "focal for the community identification 
security vulnerabilities, informal assessment of existing In 
community, improvement emergency reSDOlnse capability, user security 
Mellon 
4 A fix is a software the vendor or some other type of work around solution to eliminate the 
vulnerability. 
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total of 774 were 
publication 
on all of the vulnerabilities known to 
releasing on 
anew disclosure policy that became 
to CERT in 2000, which led to the 
not publicly information 
follows a set of 
It established 
October 9,2000. Previously, 
information on a vulnerability a to vulnerability was 
would not found. 
publicly 
of this nr"'''''''rI as above, is that 
information on a number of 
new policy states in most cases, 
However, 
,-p,-,,,rtpri vulnerabilities 
organization the initial regardless a fix has 
established. 
advisories to 
under the new policy, one can 
publishes to its mailing 
advisories are to the that 
severity. Additionally, 
which is a searchable database vulnerability' 
"may have complete (CERT). 
the number published 
on the Web. the 
to meet a 
Vulnerability " 
similar to advisories, but 
Many working in security not feel CERT was an effective nT'''''''' 
of computer vulnerability information. It was perceived as being to 
confirm vulnerabilities because would communicate with vendors until a was 
before information to 
vendors were to respond they had no 
Furthemlore, according to widely published computer 
7 
Many users believed that 
to produce quick solutions. 
consultant, Bruce 
was slow about publishing rp.'.f\r1,c even 
(Schneier, c 339). 
were 
security information did not sit well with desiring more timely 
known vulnerabilities. consider the scenario of a 
to the which is reported to CERT. 
c,t'·nn1rc dependent on infonnation would not be 
aware of the vulnerability until it clearing process. 
While administrators are kept 
exploit at will until the vulnerability is 
for timely vulnerability infonnation 
CERT is organized primarily to 
the attacker 
as this demonstrate 
effective m preventing 
the fact, many 
the organization's model of vulnerability to be ineffective in the 
Therefore, the 
to the public shortly 
vulnerabilities. 
BugTraq, a subscription-based 
popular distribution channel for the 
subscriptions are open to anyone 
approximately twenty-seven thousand 
the organization now 
the start as an open forum 
vulnerabilities" (Rauch). 
that vulnerability infonnation should be made 
a towards other models of 
HJ .... H~'"''"' in 1993, is a 
vulnerability' 
an e-mail address and number 
of the founders of 
BugTraq, explains, "BugTraq was 
no-holds-barred discussion of security 
8 
model the following manner. reports a 
vulnerabili ty to by sending an e-mail H_v''' .... F,'-' to the BugTraq list. The list 
approves the message to ensure it stays on topic of 
security vulnerabilities. After approval, the containing reported 
is sent via I to BugTraq subscriber. BugTraq method for disclosing 
the nrf"\/"'AC reporting a vulnerability to publication take 
or held seconds. The reported vulnerabilities are not for technical 
model. periods such as case with 
BugTraq contain a description a new vulnerability, 
Is posted to 
instmctions 
how to exploit or fix the vulnerability, or announcement of an automated attack to 
the vulnerability. As will discussed further, lists as BugTraq are 
because' IS .."..,u,,\o,u to those 
intentions are 
Full Disclosure Debate 
"'''UH,",''' of how to The full disclosure debate is essentially an 
window of exposure to computer security vulnerabilities. 
minImIZe 
term of exposure" to describe the until a patch 
available and users the vulnerable product apply patch. 
window of exposure. risk implied on the vertical aXIs 
malicious user will exploit vulnerability. that this 
coined the 
a vulnerability becomes 
] illustrates the 
to the risk that a 
as 
vulnerabili ty public knowledge and after users systems 
application the vendor patch). 
9 
\·tJI nerabil it:y-
a-ized 
Figure 1 
'Vendor 
pa: ehes 
4_~j,1.J1 nerabi 1 it~1 
Users 
install 
.---- eh 
(Sclmeier, 
System administrators should patch vulnerabilities h"'T("\"'" attackers can 
an vulnerability script is 
malicious users to do some damage before system 
to 
administrator knows what hit him, the other the published vulnerability exploit 
will the to fix the fast, users the 
product to protect themselves. Therefore, dilemma is somewhat of a race to see who 
will use vulnerability information to an advantage--the guy or 
A quote back to 1850s used in computer pUblications 
to represent argument for fuB b). In Rudimentary Treatise 
on the Charles Tomlinson 
"In to lock-making, there can be such a as dishonesty of intention: the inventor 
produces a lock which he honestly thinks will possess such and such and he declares his belief to 
the world. If others differ from him in those qualities, it is open to them to say so; and 
the discussion, truthfully must lead to public the discussion stimulates curiosity, and 
curiosity stimulates invention. Nothing but a and limited view of the question could lead to the 
that harm can result: if there be harm, it will be much more than counterbalanced by good." 
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While not proven to exist, many perceived benefits may arise from the public 
dissemination of vulnerability information. When a vulnerability is made public, the 
vendor of the vulnerable product is pressured to produce a quick fix or face losing the 
satisfaction of its customers and confidence of the pUblic. When the world knows about a 
vulnerability, the vendor will be more likely to produce a fix faster than if the 
vulnerability was kept private. Users of the vulnerable product are likely to anticipate a 
fix, and will apply the vendor patch or implement a work-around solution to address the 
problem. Therefore, supporters of the free flow of vulnerability infOlmation believe that 
"security is getting better a lot faster because of full disclosure" (Schneier, c). 
The person that publicly posts a vulnerability may not be the first person to 
discover it. Blackhat hackers may have previously known about the vulnerability; thus 
full disclosure is arming the security community with the same information. Therefore, 
full disclosure increases the likelihood that system administrators can defend their 
systems against attack. Keeping vulnerabilities a secret from the computer security 
community could be effective if the vulnerability truly remains a secret and those with 
malicious intentions never discover the vulnerabilities. However, as there are extremely 
skilled persons with the motivation to discover vulnerabilities, openly discussing these 
vulnerabilities will lead to more robust software and hardware. Bruce Schneier explains, 
"By aligning yourself with the natural flow of information instead of trying to fight it, 
you end up with more security rather than less" (Kurtz, McClure, Scambray xviii). 
Full disclosure supporters often present a scenario about what would happen 
without the free flow of computer security information. A fear exists that without full 
disclosure, vulnerability information would be pushed underground (McClure). This 
11 
keeps the information out hands of the administrators need it. 
Therefore, In and blackhat hackers would serve as 
of vulnerability information. 
vulnerabilities would be traded those with resources 
on how to 
connections to 
from the Computer Security Institute/FBI annual suggest 
disclosure are an attacks since 
popularized. It should be duly that the 
computers connected to over the past few years. 
three mil1ion people were By 1 approximately 
so, 
million worldwide (Internet Indicators). Therefore, an increase in 
the number of attacks may partially attributed to the exponential of the 
disclosure not cause computer security vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities hardware are not as diligent as 
security and because near impossible to produce 100% 
secure Juan a flaw in 
S (IES) only one its that 
websites to the contents a web surfer's clipboard. 
Microsoft's 
browser could 
Meanwhile, security researcher, Guninski, three flaws 
could allow someone to unauthorized access to files on 
Because every piece ships with some embedded vulnerabilities, 
12 
full disclosure may as service for reporting these vulnerabilities, 
not the cause of the 
While full disclosure for maintaining the security 
computer systems, it also arnlS those with intentions. After all, it is 
exploit a vulnerability one does not On this, Bruce m 
to Hacking Exposed, writes: 
A network with a security vulnerability is insecure to those who know about the vulnerability. If no one 
knows about it-If it is literally a that has not been discovered-then the network is secure. If 
one person knows about it, then the network is insecure to him but secure to everyone else. If the network 
manufacturer knows about it...if researchers know about it. . if the hacking community knows 
about it--the insecurity of the network increases as news of the vulnerability out (Kurtz, McClure, 
Simply put, full disclosure critical to upholding secunty to 
users. Individuals to cause use full disclosure 
announcements to learn about vulnerabilities how to write attack programs. 
dangerous are point-and-click attack available to take 
of certain vulnerabilities. Automated kiddies to break 
into systems when without the attack tool, the to perform such a 
Releasing information concerning a 
vulnerable to additional attackers until a is produced. an available 
not problem until it is properly vulnerable system. For 
reasons, organizations don't always keep up with for 
many believe that full disclosure vulnerable 
13 
systems will be compromised as more people become aware of the vulnerability and 
details on how to exploit the vulnerability become available. 
Those against full disclosure do not believe the practice is beneficial to the 
computer security community because software and hardware vendors are not learning 
from their mistakes. Vulnerabilities are still caused by buffer overflows and invalidated 
user input, among other known problems. In his hacking convention speech, Marcus 
Ranum noted that 99% of the bugs found fall into well-known flaw taxonomies. 
Ranum also addressed other "myths of full disclosure." According to Ranum, 
while hackers may already know about vulnerabilities prior to their disclosure, script 
kiddies did not. Furthermore, he does not believe the argument that vendors can't hide 
when the public knows their products are vulnerable. Ranum pointed out that the 
hacking group, IOphtcrack, has published problems with Microsoft's Windows operating 
system for which Microsoft has yet to produce a solution. Ranum also sees full 
disclosure as a tool for self-promotion. He told the audience "many of the vulnerabilities 
being disclosed are researched and discovered for the purpose of being disclosed." 
Significance of the Problem 
As more people use the Internet and society becomes increasingly dependent on 
technology, issues of computer security demand increased attention. More security 
breaches are being reported to law enforcement officials (CSI!FBI). Both government 
and the private sector are searching for ways to minimize the losses from breaches of 
computer security. The full disclosure debate provides important dialog on the best way 
to improve the state of computer security. In addition, the full disclosure debate raises 
the problem in the definition of ethical behavior in the wake of discovering security 
14 
vulnerabi 
Issue are 
important for 
attitudes of the security community on full disclosure 
sense that secure 
organizations and individuals. 
15 
systems have become increasingly 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIE\V OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Little research exists on the subject of full disclosure. Perhaps because the full 
disclosure phenomenon is a relatively new, writings on the subject consist mostly of 
articles and editorials posted to e-mail lists and websites. A few have attempted to tackle 
some of the specific issues involved. While not conducted in an academic setting, the 
following writings indicate important implications to the full disclosure debate. 
Applying Patches to Known Vulnerabilities 
Computer security consultant Dan Fanner conducted a security survey in late 
1996 to profile Intemet systems that contained exploitable vulnerabilities., While the 
study was conducted independently, without the utilization of scientific methodologies, 
the results are nevertheless significant. Using non-intrusive techniques, Falmer found 
that nearly two-thirds of the Intemet systems he scanned contained potential security 
vulnerabilities (Falmer). Automated scalming software was used to look for 
vulnerabilities previously published in CERT advisories. In other words, systems were 
found to be vulnerable because administrators did not fix known vulnerabilities by 
applying the latest patches to their systems. 
16 
Full and defacement 
Attrition (http://www.attrition.org), is a collects and di 
on security advisories, cryptography, text and attacks. 
data 
on the 
It is 
from 
cause 
known the largest 
effect relationship between the 
Martin vulnerabilities 
was fully to BugTraq. 
website tend to 
While data to the conclusion 
more security breaches, notes that this 
of events results of exploits 
scripts are 
of a single remote IS 
to potentially break into thousands 
it was done .. .In some cases, these exploits 
being made " (Martin). 
Policy for Full Disclosure 
!"' .... '"~''' defacements. 
Brian Martin 
code and 
the 
examples 
the disclosure 
publicizing exploit 
not be the case. 
created but not 
currency in the 
to vendors 
with no 
associated 
that the 
code. 
leads to 
must consider 
to a 
subculture. 
a single person 
trace of how 
in the underground for to a 
A computer consultant known as "Rain Forest 
to as FRP), 
is made 
vendors prior to 
a policy for 
to ",rAUlf1 
a vulnerability. 
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who discover vulnerabilities. FRPolicy 
on how to best communicate with 
RFP software vendors 
that those who report vulnerabilities to not to immediately 
Therefore, vendors are an efficient to 
who reported the vulnerability. np'rC'rln who reported the vulnerability is 
to "p"nr,r five working before posting the to 
a forum, The person rp1"\ Art , vulnerability should be to 
on how to reproduce vulnerabihty if requested by 
v2.0 encourages the vendor and the vulnerability to 
a joint public release/disclosure" In addition, the policy 
\IP"'1fW should recognize proper to the vulnerability, 
Difficulty in Conducting Controlled Experiments 
is no evidence to concretely aH"n'r of full disclosure. are 
in conducting experiments in arena of computer 
are not likely to cocmeJra that involve 
their systems. Additionally, are even reluctant to 
to enforcement officials Spafford, a researcher 
with CERIAS (http://www.cerias,purdue.edul), posted to 
a scenario for how one test effects of full disclosure on 
"If one wanted to do a controlled set of trials (once is not sufficient for meaningful comparison; staff 
etc could be confounding one would need to do something like: 
of roughly similar impact, and 
randomly, over release NI2 as full 
to the 
3) time and evaluate the responsiveness of the vendors to these events, 
4) don't let the vendors know they are being tested" 
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a controlled study to regarding the effects of full 
disclosure. On the dangers of this, commented to the 
"My key concern is that people on the net, and on these lists in particular, spout opinion as proven fact. 
This perpetuates folklore, just as knocking on wood or black cats. We have no evidence 
to prove in any real way that full disclosure more than it hurts/helps. We have no evidence that 
full disclosure hastens/delays release of a fix. And we have no evidence that the majority of "black hats" 
know and use all of these flaws before they are publicly announced ... If we are going to improve the way 
we handle security, we have to start by what we know and not what we have 
locally" (Spafford). 
Implications for This Study 
it is to experiments to prove the 
disclosure, this study will concentrate on the current perceptions of 
in computer security. Most found regarding full disclosure is 
of its cause, with the notable and addresses from 
consultant, Marcus Ranum. Therefore, the study OTc;ooses that a majority of III 
security field support the ful] vulnerability 
As there has been increased following Ranum's 
convention address, this study to attitudes regarding full 
vary across those in the' 
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of 
test 
J 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
this study was to the opinions of computer 
on a range of issues to full disclosure. Two hypotheses were 
a majority of those in the computer field support the full 
attitudes on vulnerability mfom1ation 
vary across participation in 
LH~"-'~'''', opinions from users 
practitioners were solicited. 
computer security community 
groups. In to 
information and computer 
used as an indicator for 
the full disclosure issue. 
of the computer to three different groups 
InfraGard, members of the U" ... HVH Systems Security ""''''V'ul 
Full 
These three CTrfH,."" were ~H'JV~'U 
on the issue. In addition, 
with the topic in theory 
of computer and 
topic. Therefore, it was 
hands-on 
consumption of computer 
20 
they may have 
are likely to have a 
is a highly 
surveys to groups 
computer security 
vulnerability information. In 
order to understand impacts full disclosure, a person must have a 
knowledge what computer are and how 
vulnerabilities a threat if exploited, A n?'YeAn knowledgeable about the full 
the roles players involved, computer 
users, administrators, vendors, blackhat 
script kiddies 1, etc, Surveys were distributed to InfraGard Information 
Systems to popular disclosure list. 
Infra Gard 
Founded in Cleveland, Ohio in 1 InfraGard exists as a partnership between 
the government and industry to promote protection our nation's 
critical including (but are not to), energy, 
banking and finance, transportation, water systems, government operations, 
The the National Infrastructure Protection 
represent U, S, governmeI 111 partnership, addressing President Clinton's 
Presidential Decision Directive 63, which for a pUblic-private partnership to reduce 
the vulnerabilities that arise from increasingly interdependent and UULVi,U,,"I,"U computer 
systems Clinton forms a 
computer to the vulnerabilities our critical "through 
1 A kiddie is: 1, A computer user who utilizes the work of other more skilled people for personal 
typically without giving back to the computer corrununity; 2, A computer user who 
and without authorization, modifies the contents of Web sites; 3, A user who claims 
skill level than he or she possesses 
Dyson, Senior Consultant at One Secure (Koch) 
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of information illegal intrusions, disruptions, 
exploited vulnerabilities information systems" (San Francisco 
There are chapters InfraGard nationwide, each with a 
field are comprised a representative local FBI field 
and members 
state and local law 
private and publicly held companies, academic institutions, and 
other (InfraGard by-laws). 
InfraGard members rprlrp'OPTl concerned with computer security 
for of in order to a of InfraGard, one 
must to abide by a of InfraGard to from 
participating or improper activities. addition, InfraGard members must 
to maintain confidentiality of proprietary, confidential, or otherwise sensitive information 
obtained through involvement with 
The approach to discussing computer security a closed 
benefiting both serves to build trust between InfraGard and the 
meet on a basis, usually once month, to discuss computer 
issues faced by their respective organizations. This of infonnation helps 
to better their own infonnation C'Af"llr1T\ threats. 
The infonnation with InfraGard about how to 
once an attack is identified, making it easier for the to prosecute criminals. 
grassroots approach serves to foster a cooperative relationship so that when something 
does law officials can the victim organization can 
move on with business. 
Limitations in of Infra Gard 
One of the pnmary difficulties in out a survey to members is 
level of privacy upholds to create maintain trust InfraGard 
may their membership in organization Members 
kept private. for this study, membership lists for chapters could 
not obtained. after a probable v .. ,,,n. .... ' check by a of the 
a 
the endeavor to a survey to was provided. 
meant obtaining approval InfraGard chapter coordinators, most 
Agents. The limitation of having the through are FBI 
Special Agents is possibility of a not to cooperate an individual 
Agent the survey. 
to cooperate this study makes it 
response as bias of the InfraGard coordinators does not 
that of individual InfraGard 
InfraGard eXt)enlen«:::ea its national on January 5, 2001, 
were initially 
because InfraGard has not been a national 
for participation 
""CUU,",,'UIL'U for very 
inclination 
to establish 
days before 
inconsistencies exist across "'u .. IJ' .... , For example, one coordinator would not 
number of while another the 
without specifically asked for this information. One 
InfraGard coordinator phoned the project advisor to his cn,mH~r was 
the stage and had to hold a meeting. was 
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reluctant to distribute the to 
president and/or official SP()K(~Spers:o at 
Information 
The 
membership organization 
"education forums, publications and 
knowledge, skill and professional growth 
employed in an information security 
enforcement official having an interest in 
suppliers of security products or 
membership dues and agree to abide the 
states that ISSA members must 
concepts and 
ISSA is organized into 
are ISSA chapters in twenty-eight U. S. states. 
the chapter was without a 
the request. 
(ISSA) is an international 
ISSA provides, 
opportunities that enhance the 
of ISSA must be 
student, attorney, or law 
marketers or 
must pay 
The ISSA Code of 
good information 
the United States were surveyed to remain consistent with 
world. At present, 
chapters located in 
sample. 
Limitations in Selection of the Information 
Similar difficulties to the 
target group. ISSA membership is not publicly 
in this study went unanswered by 
chapter presidents were vvJ:uavt .... ,\J 
as a 
participation 
each of the 
having the survey 
the ISSA chapter presidents is a not to 
of 
President results in members who never see The inclination 
'U<L'~,",'" it difficult to establish a presidents to cooperate in this 
as the bias of the lSSA 
ISSA members. 
does not necessarily 
mailing list that mentioned earlier, BugTraq is a 
over twenty-seven thousand subscribers. receive announcements 
computer and network security a wide range of C'''"Tur<:>rp 
Oftentimes, BugTraq will of detailed 
including how to exploit them and how to fix them. BugTraq is a 
the moderator must 
not verify the technical 
each posting to the list. 
BugTraq postings, but rather 
serves to the discussion to of vulnerability information. 
Limitations in Selection of Bug Traq 
BugTraq SUbscription is open to 
administrators, programmers, 
computer 
hackers (whitehat, 
and all elementary and 
a computer (often 
school children interested in causing trouble 
sample 
membership 
Therefore, this 
to the other two membership groups 
whose members adhere to a 
a 
A 
to is not necessarily in inforn1ation or 
knowledgeable to answer the survey. subscribers to to 
have the opInIOns concernIng full subscribers 
can be said to a in strong disclosure since subscribers use this 
to the full themselves. it 
wouldn't conjecture to say that represents a strongly 
Numerous were received commenting on sample selection, which 
are included section has an . 
subscription to speak English as a 
language, nor are to at all. Therefore, it was 
that many subscribers would have some difficulties understanding 
questions due to survey questions being English. E-mails were rpr'p"'Afl 
from foreign subscribers who were translating the 
. 2 questIons. 
Ballot was a great concern with BugTraq group. It was 
that some curious subscribers would answer submit the survey more 
once to see if the double would be allowed. it was 
anticipated that some subscribers would more than once in an 
2 One such e-mail reads, "The CjU<;:'UIJH:> are hard to understand".even when translated with 
babel,altavista.com." 
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effort to the results the survey. subscriber sent an e-mail 
commenting on the possibility of ballot 
Because IS a list, there was a risk that the posting 
would not moderator to subscribers. since the 
approved posting within this risk was nullified. 
Limitations In 
There are common limitations each of groups As 
previously matters with computer security issues are usually kept 
highly confidential. a certain to participate any or all computer 
studies on the part security It would not be out 
of the realm possibility for a this study as 
ofa engineering,,4 attempt. In oplOlOns the full 
run deep, as a deal of publici ty prior to this 
Therefore, in for someone to respond to he/she must be interested 
full addition, those that ~"r,--- about full are 
ones most to respond to a self-selection 
3 The e-mail comment reads, "1 know they [the results] are not going to be scientific as you are to 
account for a number injection and attacks, but would be none-the-less 
4 Social engineering is a method whereby intruders will prey on 
unauthorized access to computer systems. Social engineering is 
as a legitimate network or administrator in order to have 
or other information. 
employees to 
carried out when an intruder poses 
leak 
Survey Design 
On-line Survey 
The survey was conducted on-line 
with an 
of the 
collection, 
of computer 
"snail maiL" The 
survey 
1 (in the 2000 
to 
was thought 
technology 
practitioners 
Security 
postal mail 
It was assumed a 
use of an html 
(See 
the most effective 
participating in 
including a 
A for screen 
for data 
Previous 
postal 
the FBI conducted an annual joint 
and achieved a top reSOO]r1se rate of 
number of would be 
achieved with an survey because of ease use over a The 
survey 
directly displayed 
an 
survey in a web 
man 
A respondent 
mouse to answer and to submit This method 
submission was less time a computer 
clicked a 
because locating a pen or and making a office was not 
that 
Furthermore, it was working in security were more likely to 
up an on-line versus one contained a paper envelope. 
The e-mail 
for the 
~""""'I:,""" contained a different 
to InfraGard 
S. By distributing 
on the target 
ISSA chapters 
URLs, it was 
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(uniform resource LV".",,,,,, or web 
different were 
on their geographic location within 
to trace the 
by regIOn from and ISSA to ensure a 
representative sample was reached. This was done because in computer 
security 
example, a 
more 
Alabama. 
Limitations in 
differing opinions 
security 
than that of a 
of On-line Survey 
on location of 
in the Silicon Valley 
security administrator 
For 
maybe 
nature of this survey 
'-' ...... 'n."' ... confidentiality and 
challenges to conducting a controlled 
experiment. 
in computer 
not an option. 
knowing the 
a respondent 
were 
being traced. 
concern of 
respondents that 
addresses would not 
potential res;oona,er 
respondents had to 
survey (See Appendix A 
are often top concerns of 
as having completed the 
traced without 
working 
individual rp<,n,."" 
of survey 
is being collected 
However, as 
an obligation to 
IP addresses were not 
use that is run 
is an academic study, if 1P 
respondents this . 
in an effort to ease 
In addition, a disclaimer was to infonn 
study and results were solely use an 
was 
was 
This e-mail message to 
a JavaScript pop-up box. Potential survey 
tenns of the disclaimer to access the on-line 
a screen shot of the box). 
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As mentioned to group, not tracing individual respondents 
means there is' that same the survey more than once. 
there IS that a to more than one target group and 
recei ved more than one the survey. One such ,-.,<'nAnn,anT 
sent an e-mail stating he received the as his membership in two 
target groupS5. 
The number of potential e-mail messages 
containing an electronic link to mentioned previously, some 
InfraGard coordinators were of members in their 
chapters. BugTraq over thousand subscribers 
Subscribers may and remove from the list, twenty-
a day, seven days a week, making it exact number of 
that received the survey e-mail UA~'-'''''~r-,~'-' posted to the BugTraq 
list are placed in the BugTraq archive study may be found on 
securityfocus.com BugTraq Message to 2001-03-01). 
it's quite possible that those not could have located the 
viewing the BugTraq archive and as 
group. In addition, those that U\."""""F'." with the survey 
forwarded the message on to the survey to 
respondents sent e-mail 
5 The e-mail "I'm a member of the local InfraGard and I'm also on and several other 
lists ... Will the results of the survey be divided based on which group were collected from?" 
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hyperlink to 
this study. 
...,a~,u,-,,,. who mayor not to any of three groups In 
a/On-line 
The was authored html and JavaScript, following the web design 
Fisher 
from 
of 
academic 
at The Ohio 
were used for 
University. The web 
survey to add to the 
The appearance may varied on the operating 
web browser, and monitor the respondent. For vA,,«UJllJ a "''''ret.,," with a seventeen-
monitor to scroll five screens 
Appendix A these screen shots), a respondent with a 
undoubtedly scrolled through more screens to the 
(see 
monitor 
Therefore, 
twenty-question could appeared USIng a monitor. 
survey could have split into 
However, decision was made to nT'PcP"" 
deceptive to survey respondents. 
all 
to avoid this inconsistency. 
questions at once so as not to 
respondent was first Dn~sente:a with the (see 
A, A) to agreement with the uses of the responses. a 
respondent the button, potential respondent was effect 
he/she not agree to the "thanks anyway" was then displayed (see 
Appendix A, section C) to this potential respondent. A counter was also incremented 
(through use a cgi script) to trace number of the Cancel button was In 
the course this study. It was PV"'Pf'lPrI that of the Cancel was 
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is an indicator as to the level of privacy or general regarding 
taking an on-line 
survey itself was of three The first part 
background, second the level of famil 
as to the 
with current 
sources information, the third part opInIOns full 
arguments. were forced to choose from a menu 
was for ease data collection 
simplified script needed to 
of the 
responses were 
boxes. 
of Respondents 
through use 
The ofthe survey 
background 
analysis, as the 
nNnc.'c in a readable manner. 
buttons, drop down menu lists, and 
a series of U,",'>LnJll" to gain an understanding 
The asked if the IS 
for computer or network security way." The this question 
was to whose jobs are to computer from those whose 
have to do with were asked to their 
title from a nTn,",_fl 
because there is a 
menu list of items. menu list of job was presented 
range of job similar job 
Therefore, respondents a 
was an easier method collecting and the data. An 
available who did not comfortable with 
job 
across different 
duties 
list value was 
anyone of 
Question 3 dealt with industry association. This was an attempt to gain 
background information on respondents and to see if those working in certain industries 
would have differing attitudes towards full disclosure. For example, a person employed 
in the financial services industry might potentially be more sensitive to the full disclosure 
issue because of the sensitivity of the information being processed in financial services 
organizations. Once again , an "other" list value was provided for respondents that felt 
their job does not fit within the industries listed . Respondents were asked in question 4 to 
select from a drop-down menu list the number of years they have been working with 
computer security. This was an attempt to see if attitudes would differ with a 
respondent's level of experience. Lastly, question 5 asked if the respondent is male or 
female. This question was an attempt to profile the computer security community as well 
as to see if the two sexes would hold differing attitudes on the full disclosure issue. 
Familiarity with Vulnerability Information 
Questions 7 and 8 dealt with vulnerability sources used by respondents and their 
colleagues on a regular basis. This was an attempt to gauge a respondent's familiarity 
with the different sources of security vulnerability information and to see ifthere were 
significant differences in the sources used between the three groups. It was assumed a 
respondent would be better informed on the full disclosure issue if he/she routinely used a 
few of the listed sources of vulnerability information. In addition, it was assumed 
respondents were informed on computer security issues if they knew which vulnerability 
sources were used by others in their organization. Question 8 was also an attempt to see 
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if the 
someone 
Full 
job duties do not entail monitoring vulnerability 
the organization 
respondents to express 
because 
opmlOns usmg 
two 
of the survey 
Questions eight and a rating scale of 1-10, 10 being 
the strongest set up as follows: 
r r r r r r 
2 3 4 
This was used because it has 
gathering information about a person's 
scale provides information about the uava .. " 
of fully vulnerabilities. 
~~H~U~ ten through twenty a 
r 
Strongly Disagree 
A presents an 
because it a answer. 
r r r r 
6 7 8 9 10 
documented useful for of 
a 
(Thomas 21). In 
r 
effects 
rating scale set as follows: 
Agree 
predicament for some researchers 
eliminate the middle answer a 
to avoid temptation of respondents to choose a "middle" answer 
time (N ewton). 
positive or negative 
neither agree or 
elimination of middle answers 
in effect taking 
purposes of 
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respondents to 
ability to sit on 
it was believed 
a 
could many 
instances in which a 
select the 
were not 
F oeus of Survey 
While there are 
limited to include a 
agreed nor 
Because full 
to chose a side. 
arguments for 
This was done to 
the statement 
itself is not a 
disclosure, 
the scope of the study 
was 
the amount it take a respondent to complete the survey. 
to limit 
the 
survey concentrated 011 full disclosure, the 
necessity of the full disclosure, the of full and the 
responsibilities of who discover 
Risks 
The concentrated on some associated with full disclosure, such 
as the risk the' will aid attackers in 
issue is paramount u,,'~al'"'' without this a""'Vvl,a,,,,u 
out breaches 
full disclosure 
This 
not be as 
controversiaL 
illegal or 
movement. 
to an increased 
prove that the 
number 
the risk that disclosure information will used for 
dishonest purposes is primary argument full disclosure 
8 the risk that full disclosure will lead 
of security vu"" .... ,.;, on the 1-10 rating '''',""Ll'''''' exists to 
with an increased 
to measure the 
of full disclosure 
breaches (Martin). 
maybe 
an attempt was 
tolerance respondents have for living with 
breaches. 
an of 
The risk associated with not 
"security by obscurity") is addressed in question 
question by asking respondents to eva1uate 
as 
the previous 
that may arise from keeping vulnerabilities 
administrators who are not prepared to 
exploits. 
Characteristics that may some on of risk were examined. 
level of risk with a full announcement increases when a 
detailed exploit script to the vulnerability is A detailed exploit script then 
to exploit the vulnerability. creates more ifan 
Because the 
examine another 
with full disclosure. 
Question 10 
scale) the extent to 
risky in the 
question was relevant v .... ,~O.~."" 
lag in CERT announcements 
disclosure mailing 
vulnerabilities that 
an 
the study attempted to 
on the level of risk associated 
opinions (through use of a 5-point Likert 
vulnerability information is 
vulnerability information. This 
security felt that the 
ineffective, initiating the move to full 
(Schneier 338). On the other hand, many 
are those that have been public 
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are published in the attempted to 
perceptions of which announcements carry of risk for used in 
dishonest security immediate announcements as those on BugTraq, or more 
are those are kept private some 
Necessity 
Necessity is the quality necessary, or absolutely 
dictionary.com. if something is necessary, it is "needed to achieve a certain result or 
effect." Therefore, 
announcements are towards 
level of embedded a full 
how indispensable full 
security 
announcement can effect its 
time. 
to 
both 
towards legitimate security efforts and respondents 
were asked opinions on 
12) and necessity of 
to refer to a 
code. 
necessity "fun disclosure of vulnerabilities" (question 
exploit code" (question 13). 
of full disclosure not publication 
that defend the full disclosure of computer and security 
vulnerabilities may point to many proposed benefits that come from following the full 
model. 
an effort to 
III Question 11 
of proposed were III 
fact exist and strongly people believe 
(through use of the 5-point scale) 
opinion on whether the "public disclosure of vulnerabilities results in more secure 
products from vendors." The creation of more secure products is a commonly cited 
argument in support of the full disclosure movement (Ranum). Furthermore, a 
counterargument for this proposed benefit has also been widely discussed. Those against 
full disclosure argue that products are released with security holes based on 
vulnerabilities commonly known and published (i.e., buffer overruns and invalidated user 
inputs). Therefore, the counterargument states that full disclosure does not improve the 
security of products. 
Lastly regarding benefits of full disclosure, an attempt was made to examine 
perceptions of whether certain players in the full disclosure movement are benefited. 
While it is quite obvious that full disclosure makes life easier for scriptkiddies, the same 
is not true for whether those employed in computer and network security, vendors, and 
society as a whole have benefited. Questions 17, 18, and 19 made use of the 5-point 
Likert scale to ask respondents the extent to which they agreed that full disclosure has 
benefited the aforementioned parties. The phrase "society as a whole" was meant to 
include everyday people who depend on computer teclmology in someway or another. 
For example, Mr. Joe Average wouldn't benefit from full disclosure if it resulted in 
unauthorized persons obtaining his social security number. This question regarding the 
benefits of full disclosure to society also served as an indicator of how strongly a 
respondent is for or against full disclosure in general. 
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responsibilities of those who discover computer and security 
are often at forefront the full disclosure U,",I.JUl',",. the 
survey contained four questions the Likert about how a person 
should handle the discovery a vulnerability. Question 14 to state 
level of with the following statement, "A security professional has a 
to report discovered 
to clarify the responsibilities the discoverer, 
to publicly 
statement was 
the vulnerability. A 
npl"TPCl because full 
to " This 
level 
opponents and 
was meant 
plans 
with this 
this protocol of action (the duty to report a bug first to the vendor is stated BugTraq 
In to assess with the 
respondents if a vulnerability should first be reported to 
disclosure to public. 
previously Chapter Rain 
how to handle discovery vulnerabilities (FRP). 
FAQ 
vendor 
question 15 
any 
Puppy authored a policy on 
communications between 
discoverer vulnerability and software vendor may crucial in timing ofa 
full 
ma 
announcement. Therefore, 16 was an attempt to examine how a 
should handle an unresponsive vendor. It respondents to state their 
with """"v'''''''' a vulnerability if the 
amount " amount 
a vulnerability may depending on the complexity of 
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for a 
bug or 
vulnerabi Ii ty 
to 
particular 
software vendor, 16 asked to answer question on what 
would vv",n ... '" a amount of 
full debate for the computer security community to evaluate 
This is the wake so-called an>,lr,~ or legitimately employed 
security consultants publish vulnerability announcements and code for 
personal or to demonstrate a of hacking acumen 
(Ranum's speech). In order to assess of the ethical climate computer 
security community, U,",'Hl\..,'ll 20 asked respondents if employed computer and 
network security would benefit an ethical "'P{'TF'{1 that 
of with statement would be an indicator as to ethical 
respondents perceived working in computer security to be, with a strong level 
IS a need for a stronger foundation 
computing field. 
Prior to Survey Distribution 
Prior to study, research instrument was with a individuals 
expertise in computer Most the InfraGard 
Provisional National In the '"'''''''''' was also 
reviewed for content by an InfraGard coordinator. Assurance was 
that survey would not compromise privacy or used for commercial purposes. In 
of 
provided to 
follows: 
all contact' for advisor were 
Support from the Columbus, Ohio InfraGard coordinator was as 
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"While the FBI has not with this InfraGard is about partnering \-vith the public 
and private sectors to help about a more secure infrastmcture. Partnering in this or any such project 
can help provide all of us into the attitudes and behavior of network security personnel. After 
consultation with Ms. an examination of her survey, and an assurance that results of this survey will 
be made available as reference to InfraGard hopefully we can make the sampling as complete 
as possible while demonstrating to others our commitment to obtain objective feedback." 
--Columbus InfraGard Cincinnati Division 
After attending a Ohio InfraGard chapter, it was 
noticeable that InfraGard were interested in the survey topic. 
At the particular meeting attended, an the latest findings from 
annual joint survey of the Computer Trends concerning 
security breaches and were discussed. 
attending InfraGard ITH'PTl,n ofthe computer 
security community who would to In study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
data was a website, by respondents via a 
in an e-mail U"'~""'F;'v (see the In 
manner provided dynamic opportunities to a individuals interested 
computer security. 
and 
enonnous, 
be 
audience 
random 
was from several of the FBI -contro lIed InfraGard 
chapters. addition, 
its posting to the BugTraq cannot 
for purposes statistical testing. the study 
provoked numerous insightful from (see cpr'"",,, and 
the results present 
computer security 
Survey Distribution 
findings on atti tudes of participants in 
Because of of electronic communications, survey were not 
as much to complete on-line as would be with a 
survey. 
was 
InfraGard was approached first on 14 because cooperation 
requests were sent to each special 
on the survey would 
reach participants in the BugTraq the e-mail request was to the list 
1 An attempt was first made to distribute the survey through contacting the ISSA Board of Directors. 
on March 1. All of 
participate in the study. 
Complications with Survey 
The 
participants. However, this was to 
emphasized over 
controlled InfraGard group. 
institution was used to 
request of the 
JavaScript pop-up dialog 
privacy rights would not 
survey was 
with Microsoft 
browsers. The survey was 
older) technologies. Those using 
Linux operating system, sent 
survey (see section B, Appendix C). 
were a deadline of March 10 to 
some survey 
survey website was 
from the tightly 
masthead of the academic 
the researcher. In addi tion, at the 
institution, a 
reinforce the idea that users' 
Windows environment and was tested 
Communicator, two popular web 
other (and in some cases 
applications, and the 
that could not access the 
As the result of the use J avaScript to consent 
complaints were received (See C, 
UNIX users because it appeared as one 
However, more prevalent was the nc""",,,,,, 
un trusted source. JavaScript has a 
sentence across 
(Stein). For example, JavaScript vulnerabilities allowed 
an 
holes 
compromIses 
as allowing a web to and files from an unsuspecting user's machine. 
Unlike the cgi used to collect JavaScript code executes on the 
browser's of the connection, presenting a security risk to the person attempting to 
the 
Most of e-mail complaints the use J avaScript were from 
subscribers. Therefore, the consent box was removed 
survey the to annoyed 
respondents. was coded with a hidden 
variable to those respondents from the ones that had to access the J avaScript 
dialog The two groups were combined in analysis the data. 
A few InfraGard and ISSA chapters prefelTed to announce the on 
websites In addition or in distribution via e-mail. example, the San 
did not survey e-
because the receives numerous such Still wishing to be 
cooperative in the study, a hyperlink to was on San Francisco 
InfraGard website. A hyperlink to survey was also on the 
website2 section Appendix A). Additionally, the 
advertisements limited the ability to trace the number of respondents on 
region for the InfraGard the groups.] 
2 Implications of this are that those not belonging to the groups may have completed the sruvey. 
3 For example, the survey hyperlink for the ISSA Midwest chapters was placed on the main 
ISSA international website (www.issa.org). it was not surprising that the Midwest ISSA 
chapters had the greatest number of responses compared to other geographic regions of the ISSA table 
Responses 
Because full disclosure is a fiery, controversial topic in computer security, strong 
reactions to the study were expected. In addition, a certain amount of reluctance to 
complete a computer security survey was anticipated. In spite of the sensitivity that 
exists in regards to computer security tOPICS, an overwhelmingly positive response to the 
study was achieved. Surprisingly, the "Cancel" button on the JavaScript pop-up dialog 
box was only clicked twelve times, indicating that individuals were at least willing to 
view the survey questions before deciding whether to participate. Several of the FBI 
InfraGard coordinators and the ISSA chapter presidents were very supportive of the 
study. Some chapters extended invitations for the researcher to attend chapter meetings. 
In addition, numerous e-mail messages were received from those pleased to see a study 
regarding the full disclosure issue. 
A total of 1425 valid responses and 55 invalid responses were received. For this 
study, an invalid response is an empty data set that does not contain a hidden variable that 
identifies to which group a respondent belongs. A user may submit an invalid response 
by using the browser to directly access the cgi script (in comparison, a valid response is 
submitted when the click of the "Submit" button calls the cgi script). One may obtain the 
location of the cgi script (http://fisher.osu.edu/cgi-binlgoens-survey.pl) by viewing the 
html source code of the survey website. When one directs the browser to 
http://fisher.osu.edu/cgi-binlgoens-survey.pl, the cgi script is executed without the 
associated survey responses as intended. 
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Those submitted an invalid have done so out curiosity to 
see what do or out with the survey 
a subscriber sent an ~~"~F,~ stating, is no indication on 
the survey page how to get feedback survey, or how one will to find 
the results. I found my way to 
which contains without the survey_ I would not have 
your address to " the contact for the undergraduate and 
project advisor were included in the posting, one can only on 
other possible areas confusion that lead to of invalid rp"nn,n 
Additionally, the responses could to discredit 
results. 
Responses by 
A dif"Terent was distributed to In 
addition, different were distributed InfraGard and the 
Each Web page a hidden variable to trace the group to which the 
The table below illustrates the number received for 
Table 1: Valid survey responses by target group 
4 Out of curiosity or malicious survey respondents found their way to the index web page 
instead of submitting the survey the web page Because the index URI. 
(http://fisher.osu.edu/people/goens_l) was not directly the responses received from the 
index page cannot be traced to the three groups. 
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Additionally, number responses by geographic of the InfraGard and 
ISSA chapters are 
Table 2: 
chapters 
measure 
responses by geographic region of lnfraGard and the lSSA 
InfraGard ISSA 
Northeast 13 4 
Midwest 42 27 
Southeast 0 5 
I 
Southwest 18 13 
Westcoast 5 12 
limited access to groups, it is difficult to 
-reso()m;e bias. bias is inherently 
example, "T", .. ",e-TA" in completing a of full disclosure may 
than those not the survey. not to 
survey may be more concerns (such as 
code), and could potentially a different non-response In 
nllTn .. ,,',- of potential in the target groups were the 
some Linux users unable to run the sent 
"'''''AUF, they would have if it were technically for 
to do so. 
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Chi-Square Test of Independence 
The test independence was used to determine if two variables (the 
question and the respondent's group membership) are independent. the two 
a respondent's attitudes are not to the group 
which the belongs. such a case, the members in the computer 
security would similar The 
were into a two-way table. Following is contingency table for 
8, which asked respondents to rate the risk disclosure will lead to an 
increased of breaches. 
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Table 2: Contingency Table for Question 8 
3 
4 
7 
8 
9 
10 
numbers 
can be 
Formula 1: 
Where: 
i is the row 
j is column 
nj is the total 
Ilj is the total 
N is the total 
81 I (3.7) 2 2 
(3.8) 3 3 88 
196 i (9.1) 8 01.5) 7 211 
(131.7) 136 (6.3) 7 (8.0) 3 146 I 
I (7.2) 6 (9.1) 
6 (7.3) 
• (8.3) 10 i (10.5) 
(179.5) 172 (8.6) 10 (1 
5 I (3.4) 
I 
(96.5) 3 (5.9) 
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represent expected, or theoretical frequencies, 
by 
row I 
co\umnj, 
N 
all frequencies 825). 
these observed frequency the 
independence can computed to fiA1rArll1 whether variables are independent. The 
null hypothesis is that the two vanables are 
Formula 2: 
2 
X 
where: 
degrees of freedom = (number rows-l)(number columns-I) 
observed 
choosing an alpha level, one can use 
test is 
to the 
critical value of chi-square from a statistical table TPtPTP'" Using the above example, 
critical value of chi-square for a .01 is X .01, 18 = 34.8053 (Black 
rule is to reject null hypothesis the 2 value) is 
greater than chi-square value computed from Table 2 (using Formula IS 
14, null hypothesis carmot The null 
hypothesis means the attitudes of respondents are independent of group to which 
they belong. However, in to question 8, statistical test presents limitations 
any drawn application are " .... "..,,,,, 
problem arises because of the values some of 
and InfraGard cells. Contingency tables should not be used with a number of 
cell of than 5 because the can lead to 
inordinately chi-square values Therefore, for analysis of questions 8 and 
9, to a 1 scale was collapsed to avoid the expected values. 
The recoding to collapse data is as follows: 
Table 3: Recoding of] 0 Rating Scale to Rating 
I Old Value New V:llue 
1,2 1 
3,4 2 
I 
5,6 3 
7, 8 4 
9, 10 5 
I 
new contingency for question 8 follows: 
Table 4: Collapsed Contingency for Question 8 
BugTraq InfraGard 
. (156.06) 163 (7.4 7) 5 (9.47) 5 
2 (322.05) 15 (19.53) 10 357 , 
,3 (269.72) 273 (1 14 299 
(352.72) ! (16.89) 20 
(7.3) 8 (9.25) 18 169 
1253 60 1389 
the chi-square test with the the rlp(Yrpl~<;: 
freedom to 8. The critical for .01,8 is 20.0902 (Black A-26). Formula 2 
with the collapsed contingency value of 21.11 which is 
greater than critical the categories leads to 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Because are no problems with small-expected 
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in the lapsed one can conclude that perceptions the risk 
with full is dependent on association with the security 
P-VaJue 
P-value method tests probabili ty of a test statistic at least as 
extreme as test the assumption the is true. 
the smallest value of for which the null hypothesis can 
rejected (Black example, the p-value of a test is .05, null hypothesis 
cannot be .05 is the value alpha which null 
Therefore, null hypothesis can be at 
levels .05. In study, a computer yielded usmg 
test independence. were computed for and are 
presented Table 5 below5. 
Table 5: Computed p-values 
Question 8 9 10 11 12 13 I 14 [15 I 16 I 17 18 I 
'I 
• p-value .0067 .0197 ' .25621 <.0001 <. 3391.2902 I .7324 <.0001 I <.0001 I .0002 
i 
5 The computer statistics marked the as suspect in 
pvnprt"d frequency counts less than 5, the statistical test is not 
the \-5 scales further would still lead to 
and the ISSA samples. as the are 
in the accuracy of the statistical test. 
11, 12, and 14-20 due to 
limited in these cases. 
in the InfraGard 
19 20 I 
<.0001 I 0.0288 1 
Results 
Background of Survey Respondents 
Simple summary statistics were complied for questions 1-7, which shed light on 
the background of survey respondents. The results for questions 1-7 may be found in 
Appendix D. 1311 respondents answered the first question; with 96% of them answering 
that they are responsible for computer or network security in some way. The 
questionnaire was not comprehensive in listing the common job titles of the survey 
respondents as 20% of the respondents that answered the question chose the "other" 
response. A general trend was noted that members of the ISSA and InfraGard were more 
likely to be employed in IS management and consulting positions than those belonging to 
the BugTraq group. 
Question 3 asks what primary industry the respondent is employed. Evidently, 
the drop down menu of options was not comprehensive enough because the highest 
percentage of respondents chose the "other" response. Regardless, some trends were 
noted that correlate with the previous question. For example, the ISSA respondents have 
the highest percentage of those with consulting job titles and the highest percentage of 
those employed in the consulting services industry. Examination of the responses from 
question 3 shows that the health care and utilities industries are not as heavily represented 
in the BugTraq group. In addition, as might be expected from InfraGard's foundation 
with the FBI, InfraGard respondents have the highest percentage (21.05%) of those 
employed by the government. 
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Most ofthe survey respondents (75.5%) have five or 
working with computer security. However, there are noticeable differences the 
by group. half both and respondents 
have ",·",Un?,,. than 5 years as of the BugTraq 
Most BugTraq (62.78%) into a 
expenence of 
Males the computer field, as by survey 
respondents are male. Interestingly, were a much 
percentage respondents in ISSA InfraGard InfraGard the 
ISSA ,-PC'ClAn are 1 11 as with 2.91 in the 
BugTraq 
Questions 6 and 7 on what sources computer vulnerability 
information the respondent and colleagues regularly monitor. 
Securityfocus.com, the currently hosting mailing IS 
regularly monitored by 69.6% the respondents. to be 93% 
survey use the securityfocus.com lists, such as BugTraq6. The 
mailing or news group" was chosen by of respondents. 
Survey respondents were familiar with vulnerability infOlmation provided by 
academic institutions. However, a relatively percentage 
respondents (66%) that regularly monitor information from 
(previously discussed in chapter 1). half survey respondents regularly monitor 
6 The "NT mailing list was mistakenly included in the description for the securityfocus.com 
lists. The NT BugTraq mailing list is hosted ntbugtraq.com. Two e-mails were received from 
cornmentmg on this error. 
websites infonnation. half (59.7%) visit 
. The question 7, sources 
their colleagues use, were to the question 6 
Risks of Full 
As supported In null hypothesis that of 
are independent respondent's group can be 
8 and 9. In other words, of full depending on 
security groups with a person is associated. are significant to 
how those in the full disclosure compared to those in more 
controlled F-.HJ~'-'''' BugTraq not place a on the 
risk that full lead to an increased 
surprisingly, rated the . an number breaches 
highest. In to the risk of not disclosing a vulnerability, the among 
are not as pronounced, p-value indicates the are still 
significantly and placed a rate on the 
risk of not a vulnerability when {'{HYln"rpn to the InfraGard reSD011Ue:ms 
was no significant the target groups 10, 
which asked about in relation to the of vulnerability infonnation. Overall, 
not strong I y that vulnerability information is less risky in 
7 The researcher's intention was for the term "hacker websites" to include such infamous groups as Phrack 
Magazine and The Cult of the Dead Cow However, as the 
term "hacker" may include both black hat and white hat hackers, survey may have included 
such sites as which pledges to the traditional role as a curious, but 
not malicious or destructive activity. One e-mail message was received from a survey reSIPO[ldelrlt 
commenting on the broadness of the term "hacker. 
the wrong In other survey would that attackers are able 
to compromise '''''''PIon usmg that have been public quite some 
However, a level of agreement or disagreement statement was not achieved. 
it is hard to draw conclusions on in the computer 
community risk associated timing of 
confusion in regards to the of questions 8, and 10. 
respondents who were unable to e-mail 
interpret what 
were received 
the were asking 
may have caused respondents to not answer the 
Additionally, confused respondents may been prompted to 
response. 
a/Full 
C, section 
neutral 
subscribers that full disclosure is necessary legitimate 
or strongly 
for legitimate 
purposes. However, most ISSA and respondents 
with the statement "Full disclosure vulnerabilities is 
security " Question 1 which if "full is 
legitimate purposes," was an attempt to how would 
question 
are independent 
code is involved. null hypothesis 
that membership cannot be rejected at alpha of 
.01, but may be rejected at levels> there is a of 
support for of exploit different security 
56.98% of respondents or agreed with statement, 
ISSA InfraGard and 46.06% 
a/Full 
majority respondents the argued of 
disclosure to A higher percentage of 
in more secure products 
subscribers (90.82%) felt that 
full 
controlled groups also a high 
disclosure results more secure 
respondents or 
of agreement 
85% ISSA and 
with more secure products 
the more 
InfraGard 
produced. 
When those employed in computer have from full 
disclosure 17), the indicate 
computer security community has lesser indicated that vendors 
benefited 
agreement with 
full disclosure. ISSA respondents indicated a level 
as 28.33% of respondents the neutral 
response. Not surprisingly, the all-encompassing statement, "Society as a whole has 
benefited from disclosure," 
the questions 
of group membership. 
Responsibilities 
a majority agreement 
indicate the 
respondents. 
are not 
the 
Respondents three groups similar on the responsibilities of 
working computer security. The majority with statement, "A 
professional has the responsibility to 
Interestingly enough, no one in 
respondents In the InfraGard 
vulnerabilities should be 
public. Again, nobody in 
the vendor, while one 
more in response to 
does not the 
amount of time, that vulnerability 
expected, the BugTraq group held 
statement. However, the majorities 
agreed with the statement, SUppo11ing 
vendor cooperation. 
The majorities in all 
would benefit from an ethical 
an established ethical code 
highest level of support a of 
a high level of agreement with a 
vulnerabilities to vendors." 
statement, while three 
also indicate that 
to disclosing the vulnerability to the 
with reporting a vulnerability to 
disagreed. The three groups differed 
a vulnerability is reported to a vendor, if 
what you consider a reasonable 
public" (question 16). As would be 
agreement with the previous 
ISSA and InfraGard also 
announcements in absence of 
<:>Ol""pp/i that the computer security community would 
working in computer security 
and InfraGard groups have 
two groups to hold the 
and InfraGard groups did 
of the BugTraq respondents 
from an ethical code. 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
The this study was to determine the 
perceIves proposed and of risk 
Additionally, attitudes concerning 
security 
with 
those who 
disclosure. 
vulnerabilities were of those interested in computer 
security were surveyed results were across 
majority participants the study were 
disclosure mailing list Participation was several 
to BugTraq full 
of the 
coordinated computer 
Security 
organization, participated in 
Conclusions 
Survey 
group, Additionally, several 
(ISSA), a professional membership 
Conclusions drawn the results 
that are ;:)\"U';:);:)\".U below. 
of the 
below. 
1. 
yielded 
of 
interesting 
I1PICfrp,p of risk disclosure arulOuncements 
vary on a person's In 
BugTraq subscribers do not feel full disclosure is as harmful as those in 
professional computer security groups, as the ISSA. Not 
surprisingly, BugTraq feel the that not 
information cause a "'",ner",,,, of risk those involved 
computer security. results that there is no strong consensus regarding 
the possible effects of full disclosure across the various types of persons 
employed in computer security. 
2. There is a high level of perceived necessity for full disclosure alIDouncements in 
aiding legitimate security efforts. Attitudes regarding the necessity of full 
disclosure are not independent on association in various computer security 
groups. However, attitudes explicitly regarding the necessity of exploit code are 
similar across groups. 
3. Agreement on a broad range of ideas concerning perceived benefits of full 
disclosure is not independent of group membership. For example, BugTraq 
subscribers felt the strongest that full disclosure does result in more secure 
products. 
4. Attitudes on reporting vulnerabilities to vendors are independent of group 
membership. There was a consensus that those working in computer security 
should report discovered vulnerabilities to the vendors of the vulnerable products. 
Consensus was remarkably strong that vulnerabilities should be reported first to 
the vendor before disclosure to the pUblic. 
5. Opinions about whether vulnerabilities should be publicly disclosed in the 
absence of vendor cooperation are not independent of group membership. 
Consistent with the mindset of the previous findings, BugTraq subscribers felt the 
strongest that vulnerabilities need to be publicly disclosed if the vendor does not 
address the reported vulnerability in a reasonable amount of time. 
6. The outlook on whether those employed in computer and network security would 
benefit from an ethical code of conduct is independent of group membership. 
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Respondents across the three 
would be beneficial. 
Limitations 
of groups surveyed a code of ethical 
study from problems in technical of on-line 
survey, method in which survey was distributed, and from wording the 
questions. The study failed to survey a rpr,rp,opn 
computer 
unwilling to run 
community due to the exclusion of 
JavaScript code. Survey distribution was 
of 
or 
to The 
number of persons the survey e-mail could not be controlled in the 
instance 
such 
would 
InfraGard and ISSA groups. Those of the 
access to the survey. Additionally, no were put place to 
respondents from survey more than once. It was believed that 
were utilized, as collecting of 
participation and serve as a challenge some to ways 
controls. 
study 
it 
the numerous e-mails sent the of questions, it must noted that 
the wording used YW",,"O.., limitations to the study. Several respondents were confused as 
to the "<OYlnr.c were and would have additional 
D, Appendix C). Responses to questions may depending on how a 
person interpreted the question was asking. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
This 
generally favor 
raIses 
vulnerability 
supports the idea that 
full disclosure model of 
as full 
the specific vendor 
systems 
Therefore, 
wild plays an important role on 
attitudes regarding 
bring additional H", ... c,~a to how those in 
prefer to be 
that a strong majority 
the computer security 
vulnerability' This 
Issue. 
and the number of vulnerable 
good/hann that full 
scenarios of vulnerabilities 
security community 
brings. 
contacting vendors with security This study 
vulnerabilities .... ". ... ",.". the infonnation to public. Therefore, rpc:p::!1'r 
to the current body of 
on how 
vulnerabilities should disclosed would 
Rain Forest a start in this 
be tested and usefulness. 
Specific to survey data may be more in depth to 
the background respondents has a relationship on their 
regarding full For example, be uncovered across 
expenence sectors. While be 
may provide for those to study social and ethical III 
computing. 
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Boston: 
APPEl\DIX A 
A.A respondent is first to the below d' box to confirm 
the survey temlS. 
a potential "OK" in the dialog box, 
is displayed 
Com puter and Network 
Survey 
2 
4 
5 
Do:nw:!m S browser. 
Information 
r no 
cornputef S8curllY? 
6 'o1',n];3t security vulnerability sources do you regularly monitor or use? (please select 811 trl8t app~{) 
r E-59CUri~! Or-tine 
NT 
7. Wilat sources are you aware of that others in your organization concerned with secuntyvuinerabllltJes 
regularly monitor or use? (please select all that apply) 
r 
r 
lists NT 
E-secunly Online 
Vendor websites 
67 
r I r r 4 
9 On £l scale of 1-10, 
security of not 
r 1 r 2 
r Strong~1 
Oisegre8 
r r 4 r 
r 
r 
r r 8 r 9 r'IO 
I would 
r 7 r 8 r 9 r 10 
(lskV In the hands of 
r ~1811trai r Agree r Strongly 
,Agree 
11 Public Cllscic)sU(A of vulnerabilities result5 In more secure products Irorn vendors 
r S,rongt,i r r r Agree r Strongly Disagree Agree 
12. for legitimate secuntv 
r Strongly r r Neutral Agree Disagree 
13, FUll of necessary for legitimate seclIfirl 
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In (omput"r 
SCript klddies than 
14. A se~uflty 
r 
A vulnerability should be 
r 
r :':,lrOllgly 
r Agree 
r Agree 
r Slrong!y 
Agree 
r Strongly 
from 
r Strongly 
19. full 
r 
Drsa:]r88 r Disagree r 
r 
r Agree Agree 
Those in benefit frrm, 
r Slrongry r r Neutral r Agree 
for oartl<,;H)i311 rlld In 
C. If a potential respondent does not agree to the terms of the survey, the below screen wi II 
be displayed in the potential respondent's web browser. 
Cmnputer and Neh\rork Security Vulnerability Infonnation 
Survev 
., 
Thank you for your consideration to participate Y OIJ may contact ffi'l~lJ;' or my adVlsor, Pr')f~ssor Richard Murdock. if you ha'.le questions 
concerning this study. 
ThankyolJ, 
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the 1SS1\ chapters 
the stud" 
Security Survey 
The SUfV'::;;Y 
up \UltiJ March t:), 200 I 
on 
on their respective 
website for 
APPENDIXB 
is the sent to 
BUGTRAQ subscribers, 
I'm an Ohio State University MIS & Account student on an 
te thesis ect computer security vulnerability 
information. I have developed a ionnaire on the topic of ful 
disclosure. I would ate your aking ten minutes or so to 
ete the survey below: 
http://fi l/ful osuresurvey.htm 
I will be collect survey responses up until March 10, 001. I will 
not IP addresses or I survey responses to individual 
in any way. I would be more than to share the results of this 
survey when my ect is complete. 
The results of this survey 
t so I may "with 
this project under the 
Murdock from the OSU Account & MIS 
murdock.3@osu.edu or 92-1720. 
Sincerely, 
Tami Goens 
BSBA MIS & Account 6/0 
o State University 
goens.1@osu.edu 
home 614.421.0318 
cell 614 2 8153 
Dr. Richard Murdock 
Thesis Advisor 
Professor, Ohio State University 
Accounting & MIS Department 
murdock.3@osu.edu 
ice 614.292. 720 
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to support my 
dist nction" in MIS. I am 
of Professor Richard 
He be reached 
is the message sent to 
«InfraGard Coordinator», 
tudent from 
on the full 
members. Therefore, 
of direct 
inators. 
t a hes 
vulnerability informa ion. 
sseminate the e-ma 1 
forward my survey 
Support from 
Ie the ~BI has not with this project, 
InfraGard is about par ic and private sectors to 
bring about a more secure infrastructure. Partnering in this or 
any such project can help all of us insights into the attitudes 
behavior of network security After consultation with 
Ms. Goens, an examination of her and an assurance that results 
of this survey will be made available as reference to InfraGard 
coordinators, hopeful we can the as complete as 
sible while demonstrat to others our commitment to obtain 
ective feedback." 
-Columbus InfraGard sub-
is a link to my survey on 
vulnerabi ity information I wil 
until 10, 2001. apprec 
to your members. 
tp://fisher.osu. 
, Cincinnati Divis 
sclosure of security 
t survey responses up 
your cooperation in forward this 
.htm 
This survey is for my te thesis distinction project at The 
Ohio State University. To alleviate concerns, I will not be 
tracking IP addresses or Ii survey responses to individuals. I am 
attempt to distribute my survey to every ter of InfraGard 
nat onwide I will be certain to share the results of this survey with 
InfraGard. 
this project under the sion of Professor Richard 
Please feel free to contact my advisor or me if there are 
.edu 
MIS & Accounting 
University 
4.421.0318 
64 8153 
Thes Advisor 
Dr Richard Murdock 
Profes ,Accounting & MIS Dept 
The Ohio State University 
Murdock 3@osu.edu 
Office 614 292.1720 
IS sent to lSSA presidents. 
Mr. President», 
I'm student ~g on an raduate 
computer security vulnerabil information. 
I received your -mail address from the ISSA web site. For my ect. 
I wish to distribute a link to an on- email. 
nquiring whether you may dis I to your 
ter members. I have received cooperation the I Columbus, 
OH ISSA ter to send my survey link to However, I am 
attempt ng to survey those in IT securi field on a national 
leve. have al distributed my survey to InfraGard coordinators 
nationwide for distribution to members. would be interested to see 
f the two groups of IT ssionals d different views. 
The result of this survey will be used to support my 
thesis ect so I may te" th dist on" in 
purpose of this research is to examine the ic availability of 
computer security vulnerability information. With the risk that this 
information leads to an increased number of securi breaches, am 
attempting to examine the benefits of I disclosure. I'm also 
tempting to clarify what s ethica behavior in the wake of 
discovering a computer security vulnerability. 1 am t this 
project under the of Professor Richard Murdock from the OSU 
Account & MIS He may be reached at murdock.3@osu.edu or 
292 O. 
fvly survey 
: //fi ect htm 
I will be collect 
deep appreciate 
I would be more than 
ect is complete. 
incerely, 
Tami 
BSBA MIS 
The Ohio 
goens.l@osu.edu 
home 614.421.0318 
cell 614.264.8 3 
Dr. Richard Murdock 
Thesis sor 
survey responses up unt March 10, 
support this link t 
/01 
ty 
to share the results of 
Professor, Ohio State University 
Accounting & MIS Department 
murdock.3@osu.edu 
office 614.292.1 20 
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OOL I would 
your members. 
survey my 
APPENDIXC 
are during course this 
A. on the selection ... 
"I wish I lived in a world where the people 11Wi 
tinction" were those who learned how sil on 
self-selected are. Evidentally, I don't." 
is sure to be more in of full-disclosure 
"Do you I to gene rat an unbiased 
" ':Tl you' 1 ha ve :Tluch atist cally relevant dat 
from the survey. The partie of your survey would seem to be 
from segment of the 
bias towards full disclosure 
tion which al has a particular 
(hence their to the bugtraq 
mai ) " 
"I 1tJould responses you fro:Tl Focus 
d ferent than those from, 
Foundat I or the ever 
say, a Micro$oft 
Ure fan 
club." 
"A f-selected survey has I ttle to no statistical value. You have an 
ext skewed select for not just subscribers to 
BUGTRAQ, but subscribers to BUGTRAQ who take the time to fill out 
your survey. Any conclusions you draw from the collected data should 
carefu t using biased 
B. text-only users on the survey 
I: 
This URL is unreadable standard 1.0. In other words 
unreadable in a text mode browser. I would be happy to 
survey once it has been presented to HTML 1.0 
1.1 standards ( ee RFC 945 and/or 
"Your rvey n' work wit Lynx." 
"Is there reason for 
assume that many of the 
the consol .... /1 
"Your survey is 
should design 
not readable with I would 
you are ng would be more used to 
sable survey next time." 
I I 
number of traq subscribers sti 1 use console 
to read their mail Additionally, use 
browsers. s your page to be 
I you exclude a segment of the 
otherwise I and may t the 
Y I 
non text browser-friendly 
my ;vay 
out your survey. 
"I 
use of JavaScript... 
how much 
enable 
the 
~1a:1y peop:Ce 
those is Unix envi 
text email readers ike 
pos ible." 
ecurity community to requ re 
" the script code on the 
when the desired effect can 
[Y] used How many y professionals do you 
turned on? In any event. you 
all that the JavaScript was 
think will go to a foreign site with that 
could have used a standard ink. for 
doing.1I 
"You do 
the 
expect security a 
• do you?" 
would be honored 
ion of JavaScript. Any 
my office for security 
readers are so. 
minded people 
II 
securi 
for your survey;-) 
your 
reasons, you know. ) " 
to enable JavaSc in 
would not request 
in browsers s 
find out that 
in the fact that 
I have disabled 
"I fi i ironic that JavaScript is to your security 
urvey." 
"I wanted ete your survey. but as I'm a security aware 
etc. is disabled in my browser sett . I think 
case for many BugTraq subscribers, due to i.e. the 
from Guninski and other So the 
I think it would be a html 
the survey." 
more 
the 
77 
't go 
Any 
t / s 
I 
"I! 
I would suggest that you rework your web page 
so as to remove it; you will very ike get much better response i 
you do." 
"I would recommend removing 
that first appears, as In my 
on one line. 
("consent dia og 
Linux) all of the text 
Visit the i with JavaScript disabled presents the user with the 
text "consent dia box please consent to partic in this s 
without any actual means to consent, or to partie 
accessible would go a way towards 
to fill in your ionnaire." 
D. questions. 
"The nine to me." 
tion lilO could more han "I thi 
is. 
once 
answer would be different if the same question were 
hat and 
"I will answering your survey imprecise and 
reflect s de ign .. 
term 'hacker' has many different meaning 
culture. Questions 8 and 9 are so vague as 
a vague phrase, a he 
ng on context and 
to be unanswerable. In 
sort of 'vulne y 
What is the baseline for the risk 
sk are we 
'disagree, agree' etc so 
I have a remark on question 
about at 
I 
Question 1 
didn't 
forma ion' are we talking 
assessment? In question 9, 
al I cannot guess it." 
of the and 
sks for a timeframe yet 
one. 
understand the question 
want to t (I am not a native English 
differently and specify what risk are thinking of." 
> 
> 
8. On a 
the risk 
lead 
cale of 1-10, with 10 be the strongest, I would sess 
that publ available vulnerability information will 
an increased number of security breaches as a 
An increased number of breaches as to *what*? The answer 
varies based on the miss of the question. e.g., 
As to the number of breaches if released any 
information? Yes, more information leads to more breaches. 
to the number of breaches security information is out 
jus: no: on ic lis s/ :es to which everyone has access? 
abou: :he same number, actual 
The eresting data point, however, 't the total number of 
breaches, but the distribution the breaches. More public 
information may lead to a greater sheer number of breaches, but 
breaches will be among sites that do not use the information 
mit risk. This allows sites wi tical assets (e.g., financ al 
institutions) reduce their risk, even if the risk for others may 
increase as a result. 
a scale of 1-10, with 10 the strongest, I would assess 
computer security of not disclos 
as a 
It's not clear what you're ng to Which risk are you concerned 
about I can think of several off the top of my head: 
* The sk that they won't have a job if there isn't a constant flow 
of vulnerabilities? 
* The ri k that customers won't see the need to 
without disclosure? 
on security 
* 
is 
> 16. 
of not knmving 
risk to their 
a vulnerability is 
> does address the 
reasonable 
The 
the 
'''1' 
answers 
(e. g., 
(Strongly 
5 Ie 
needs 0 be reworded. 
You don't fine 'full dt clos • but 
You don't di ti sh between *vendors* 
*discoverers of the hole* doing the discI 
difference 
It' clear whether 'vendors' refers 
vendors the particular 
real broad 
actual 
?} '? 
exist 
a vendor, if that vendor 
in what you consider a 
ty should be made ic. 
Agree) don't match 
1 year?)" 
this is a 
in genera I or 
security vulnerabil 
I would argue that vendors 
but are hurt in other ways. 
Quest 8 difficult to parse - are we asked to asses the severity 
of the risk to computers, or the amount of increased risk, or the count 
ess of severity? 
Question 9 doesn't make a lot of sense risk to whom? To each other? 
I can't parse Question 10. 
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[1' 
separa 
code and 
is the 
"I don' k your 
take the survey but 
wou d treat those 
Hatters write their own 
Kiddies. Even there 
t Kiddies, I do not believe 
I 
n till not knowi IrJr.at you re 
questions over and over 
ng, I gave up." 
il which found off you phrase the last question 
you're randomiz from a of questions or 
like that; you are, it's the about benefi of an ethical code of 
conduct) as something to the effect of in the business 
would benefit from an ethical code. "Would" ies that we don't 
current have any such , a charac zation I'd st disagree 
h .. 
E. Selected 
such 
"I commend you 
an 
it." 
\\,,,1 ! 
insightful comments on the 
c like 
as 
for ta such a 
c, but so many 
what 
the resources of 
work l " 
thesis. 
not to talk about 
for ome t 
. It has 
think, to 
(not "disgusted, many of my colleagues were), but 
because many s points were indeed legitimate. 
agree with the conclusions he drew from but the 
in that started the recent 
\\I1m exploi s as a general rule. However, it 
my clients) top the ILOVEYOU worm before we had 
fi e from our AV vendor. Our Outlook app back 
he 
an 
up within a few hours after we had literally unp the 
cable from the back of the mail server to top the initial 
tack ... Again, 
results l " 
it was an excellent s and I'd see the 
experience leans towards disclosure. Timing of the 
disclosure may 
manner would seem 
it is only a 
ted. 
a vulnerability in a time 
global disclosure. In the of 
matter of time before a vulnerability is found and 
s Power, be forewarned sooner, than later.) 
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I believe that 
trusted 
the global world 
The future security 
locat that can 
Follow the 
that cauti 
. ) 
essionals have a code of 
the 
thics. We are 
fect is the 
of information there is no one source for answers. 
lly be sites and 
s into ting their 
are. (One must never be so 
all informat is not 
I admire your courage to a profession that is needed so badly, 
understood so poorly and so casual be those that need your 
services the most. Continue on.. break ground, make new 
dis s and upon that which has been accomplished. 
Pi we all 
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APPENDIXD 
RESULTS 
1: Are responsible for computer or network in any way? 
l=yes 
o 
o 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
o 48 0.03661 0.03661 
1263 0.96339 100000 
Total 1311 
2 Levels 
ISSA 
3 
82 
Question 2: What is your primary ,job title? 
2=Network Security Administrator/Mangement 
Security 
Probability Cum Prob 
0.12393 
0.26862 0.39255 
3 146 0.10458 0.49713 
4 50 0.03582 0.53295 
5 187 o 13395 066691 
6 183 0.13109 0.79799 
7 282 0.20201 1.00000 
Total 1396 
7 Levels 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
1 138 11 24 173 
2 348 9 18 1 375 
3 129 9 8 i 146 
14 -48 1 1 50 
.5 157 19 11 187 
16 181 2 0 183 
7 259 I 9 14 282 
1260 60 76 1396 
. 
3: What is the primary ind of your 
Level Count 
1 1 
2 88 
3 21 
4 190 
5 102 
6 
7 213 
8 26 
9 363 
Total 1396 
9 Levels 
raGard 
16 
5 
'> j 
5 
6 
.7 
·8 18 4 
.9 338 16 
60 
tion? 
Probability 
0.22278 
0.06304 
0.01504 
0.13610 
0.07307 
0.05874 
0.15258 
0.01862 
0.26003 
311 
88 
21 
190 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
Cum Prob 
0.22278 
0.28582 
0.30086 
0.43696 
051003 
0.56877 
0.72135 
0.73997 
1.00000 
Question 4: How many have you been working with computer security'? 
1 year 
years 
3=3 
4"A 
9=9 
10,=10 
11 1 15 years 
1 5-20 
; 
0 
1 
2 
I 3 
4 
· 
• 5 
6 
• 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
.13 
BugTraq i 
99 
·····99 
249 
226 
164 
152 
64 
38 
36 
10 
27 
71 
12 
13 
1260 
--
ISSA i InfraGard 
1 6 ! 106 
5 i 1 105 
6 
; 
6 ; 261 
4 14 244 
2 3 169 
10 7 i 169 
3 1 68 
2 4 ! 44 
3 6 145 I 
0 3 . 1~~ 
1 6 34 
9 7 87 
8 3 23 
6 9 28 
60 76 1396 ! 
---
Question 
O=femaie 
}=male 
you male or fema 
86 
Level 
0 
Total 
2 
o 
Count Probability Cum Prob 
55 0.04000 0.04000 
1320 0.96000 1.00000 
1375 
Levels 
Qu 
(resu 
6: \Vhat security vulnerability sources do you 
for all three target groups combined) 
mailing lists 
NT BugTraq, fOclls-linux, etc.) 
lists or newsgroups 
s lCA T database 
monitor or use'! 
member security organization 
security vulnerability information 
provider 
Question 6 (continued): What security vulnerability sources do you regularly 
monitor or 
mailing lists 
-linux, 
vulnerability infonnation 
service provider 
17=Other 
Question 6 (continued): What 
monitor or use? 
I =SecurityfoClls.com 
2=Securityfoclls.com mailing iJsts 
(BugTraq, NT BugTraq, foclls 
mailing lists or 
4=NIST's rCAT database 
alerts 
6=SANS secllrity digest 
Cybernotes 
8=CIAC bulletins 
9"""Packetstorm 
vulnerability sources do you regularly 
89 
1 O=E-security Online 
11 = Vendor websi tes 
12=Hacker websi tes 
13=Other websites 
14=Security audit services 
15=Professional member 
16=Private security 
provider 
Question 6 (continued): 'What security vulnerabHity sources do you larly 
monitor or use? 
broken down by 
Q6 2: 
o (no) 
] 
(yes) 
1260 
72 
96 
40 ]300 
60 1396 
12 
60 76 1396 
SSA InfraGard 
16 22 472 
44 54· 924 
60 ·1396 
90 
Question 6 (continu . What 
monitor or use'? 
Results broken down by 
Q6 7: 
,0 
1 
1260 
Q6 _9: Packetstorm 
BugTraq 
o (no) 749 
1 511 
(yes) 
1260 
vu ility sources do you regularly 
InfraGard 
4 
27 92 
60 1396 
60 76 1 
ISSA InfraGard 
• 
46 71 866 
14 5 530 
60 76 1396 
InfraGard 
69 1328 
7 168 
76 1396 
91 
Question 6 (continued): What security vulnerability sources do you regu 
monitor or 
Results broken down by 
1 
(yes) 
625 30 
260 60 
43 698 
Q6 12: Hacker websites 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 1 
o (no) 486 32 44 1562 
1 774 28 32 .834 
(yes) I 
1260 60 76 11396 
Professional member security or anization 
Bn InfraGard 
11 1190 
123 45 38 .206 
yes) 
1260 60 76 
92 
Question 6 (continued): What security vulnerability sources do you regularly 
monitor or use? 
Results broken do .. "n by target group: 
Q6 16: Private security vulnerability provider 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
o (no) 1157 57 1 
1 103 7 19 1 
I (yes) 
1260 60 
Other 
BugTraq 
958 
302 
1260 60 
Question 7 (continued): What sources are you aware of that others in your 
organization concerned with security vulnerabilities monitor or use'? 
2=Securityfocus.com mailll1g lists 
(BugTraq, focus -linux, etc.) 
Question 7(continued): What sources are you aware of others in your 
organization concern with security vulnerabilities monitor or 
ling' 
focus -Jinux, etc.) 
9=Packetstorm 
95 
1 Online 
1 websites 
12=Hacker websites 
13=Other 
I 
1 
1 
service provider 
17=Other 
PrOD 
Question 7 (continued): What sources are you aware of that others in your 
organization concerned with security vulnerabilities monitor or use? 
1 =SecurityfocLls.com 
2=SecurityfocLls.com mailing lists 
(BugTraq, NT BugTraq, focus -linux, etc.) 
3=other mailing lists or newsgroups 
4=NlST's lCAT database 
5=CERT alerts 
6=SANS secunty digest 
7=NIPC Cybernotes 
8=CIAC bulletins 
9=Packetstonn 
(Frequencies 
level Count Probability Cum Prob 
o 1248 0.89398 0.89398 
1 148 O.106m 1.00000 
Total 1396 
2 Levels 
96 
1 O=E-security Online 
II=Vendor websites 
12=Hacker websites 
13=Other websites 
14=SecLirity audit services 
} 5=Professional member security organizatio 
16=Private security vulnerability infonnation 
service provider 
17=Other 
Question On a scale of 0, with 10 the strongest, I would assess the 
that publicly available vulnerability information will lead to an increased number of 
secu breaches as a (respondent a 1-10 ra 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
1 85 0.06120 0.06120 
10 107 0.07703 0.13823 
2 88 0.06335 0.20158 
3 211 0.15191 035349 
4 146 0.10511 0.45860 
5 166 0.11951 0.57811 
6 133 0.09575 0.67387 
7 192 0.1 0.81210 
8 199 0.14327 0.95536 
9 0.04464 1.00000 
Total 1389 
10 Levels 
* BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
1 163 5 5 173 
2 332 15 10 357 
~ 273 12 14 299 342 20 29 391 
5 143 8 18 
• 
169 
1253 60 76 1389 
* 1 10 scale collapsed to 1-5 scale as Uh).\..> .... ·J0,-O·"-' In 
97 
Question 9: On a 
those employed in 
(respondent given a 1 
4 
5 
* 1 10 
of 1-10, with 10 being 
security of not 
° rating scale). 
Level Count Probability 
1 53 0.03852 
2 105 0.07631 
3 202 0.14680 
4 394 0.28634 
5 622 0.45203 
Total 1376 
5 Levels 
179 7 
577 
1241 
collapsed to 1 
j wou Id assess 
a vulnerability as a 
Cum Prob 
0.03852 
0.11483 
0.26163 
0.54797 
1.00000 
15 
21 
22 
75 
as In '"",UJILI 3 
to 
Question 10: Historical vulnerability information is less risky in the hands of black 
hat hackers and kiddies than recently published vulnerability information. 
Respondent given following 
3=neutral 
4=agree 
disagree 
Level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
Count Probability Cum Prob 
0.11328 0.11328 
0.31530 0.42857 
279 0.20130 0.62987 
429 030952 0.93939 
84 0.06061 1.00000 
1386 
5 Levels 
99 
11: Public disclosure of results in more secure products 
the 
disagree 
agree 
5 
4 
3 
t 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
1 17 0.01224 0.01224 
2 60 0.04320 0.05544 
3 66 0.04752 0.10295 
0.35925 0.46220 
5 747 0.53780 1.00000 
Total 1389 
5 Levels 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
1 15 1 1 17 
2 44 3 13 60 
3 56 5 5 66 
4 432 29 38 499 
5 706 22 19 747 
1253 60 76 1389 
100 
12: II disclosure of vulnerabil is necessary for legitimate secn 
purposes. 
t given the following options: 
disagree 
5 
2 4 
3 
t 
Probability Cum Prob 
000863 0.00863 
0.03379 0.04242 
3 0.06973 0.11215 
4 0.35370 0.46585 
5 743 0.53415 1.00000 
Tolal 1391 
5 Levels 
• 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
1 9 1 2 12 
2 29 7 11 47 
3 79 
• 
7 11 97 
.4 433 26 33 492 
.5 705 19 19 743 
I 1255 60 76 1391 
Question 13: Full disclosure of exploit code is necessary for legitimate security 
purposes. 
Respondent fol options: 
level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5 
102 
Count Probability Cum Prob 
62 0.04457 
0.17685 
306 0.44141 
491 0.35298 0.79439 
286 0.20561 1.00000 
1391 
Levels 
Question 14: A professional has a responsjbility to discovered 
vulnerabilities to vendors. 
Respondent given the following options: 
3=neutral 
Level Count Probability 
1 22 0.01588 
2 55 0.03971 
3 65 0,04693 
4 411 0.29675 
5 832 0,60072 
Total 
5 Levels 
BugTraq 
• 1 22 
.2 
3 4 4 
4 24 18 411 
5 749 51 832 
1249 60 76 
103 
Question 15: A vulnerability should be reported to 
the vulnerability to the public. 
Respondent given the follo'Ying options: 
disagree 
Levet 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Totat 
Count 
13 
30 
110 
449 
788 
1390 
5 Levels 
prior to disclosing 
5 
Probability Cum Prob 
0.00935 0.00935 
0.02158 0.03094 
0.07914 0.11007 
0.32302 0.43309 
0.56691 1.00000 
InfraCard 
0 13 
1 30 
7 5 110 
449 
788 
1390 
104 
Question 16: Assuming a vulnerability is reported to a vendor, if that vendor does 
not address the reported vulnerability in what you consider a reasonable amount 
time, that vulnerability should be made public. 
Respondent given the following options: 
3 
2 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
1 4 0.00289 0.00289 
2 27 0.01948 0.02237 
3 62 0.04473 0.06710 
4 545 0.39322 0.46032 
5 748 0.53968 1.00000 
Total 1386 
5 Levels 
105 
Question 17: Those employed in computer and network security have benefited 
from full disclosure. 
Respondent given the following options: 
2 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
1 5 0.00360 0.00360 
2 15 0.01080 0.01440 
3 68 004896 0.06335 
4 444 0.31965 0.38301 
5 857 0.61699 1.00000 
Total 1389 
5 Levels 
ISSA InfraGard 
o 
106 
Question 18: Vendors have benefited from full disclosure. 
Respondent given the following options: 
5 
4 
3 
Level Count Probability 
1 6 0.00433 
2 72 0.05191 
3 224 0.16150 
4 572 0041240 
5 513 0.36986 
Tolal 1387 
5 Levels 
107 
Cum Prob 
0.00433 
0.05624 
0.21774 
0.63014 
1.00000 
Question 19: Society as a whole benefited from full disclosure. 
Respondent the following options: 
1 =strongly 
Level Count Probability Cum Prob 
1 11 0.00793 0.00793 
2 58 0.04179 0.04971 
3 192 0.13833 0.18804 
4 554 0.39914 0.58718 
5 573 0.41282 1.00000 
Total 1388 
5 Levels 
108 
Question 20: Those employed in computer and network security would benefit from 
an ethical code of conduct. 
Respondent given the following options: 
1 =strongly disagree 
2=disagree 
3=neutral 
(resp20 ) 
4=agree 5 
5 "strongly agree 
4 
3 
2 
(Frequencies ) 
level Count Probability 
1 11 0.00793 
2 64 0.04611 
3 244 0.17579 
4 543 0.39121 
5 526 0.37896 
Total 1388 
5 Levels 
BugTraq ISSA InfraGard 
1 10 1 0 
2 60 2 2 
3 232 2 10 
4 490 21 32 
5 461 34 31 
1253 60 75 
109 
Cum Prob 
0.00793 
0.05403 
0.22983 
0.62104 
1.00000 
.-------~ 
11 
64 
244 
~~ 
543 
526 
1388 
